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Abstract 
This paper questions the idea that there are two opposing paradigms of educational 
research, often called positivist versus interpretivist. It argues that the ‘paradigm’ 
term has been used to avoid philosophical discussions about the nature of 
educational research. This has been done by understanding ‘paradigms’ to reflect 
metaphysical positions about connect epistemological and ontological assumptions. 
Problems with this conception of ‘paradigms’ are discussed including how to justify 
combining different research methods. The paper also criticises treating pragmatism 
as a ‘paradigm’ by distinguishing between everyday pragmatism and philosophical 
pragmatism. Philosophical pragmatism is presented as a diverse approach that is 
naturalistic, fallibilistic and overcoming of false dichotomies, that can risk leading to a 
self-defeating relativism. How these have been addressed are then discussed. This 
has involved introducing some transcendental or impersonal elements into 
pragmatism without reverting to a metaphysical realism. This involves a discussion 
of various philosophical perspectives, pragmatic realism, evolutionary epistemology 
and critical realism, as relevant to educational research. The final section draws on a 
version of Dewey’s pragmatist model of inquiry informed by some of Habermas’s 
early and later epistemological ideas as the basis for thinking about educational 
research that encompasses flexible and combined methodological approaches. The 
paper places research methodology as having a central focus in educational 
research, with its links to epistemology and methods. It concludes that pragmatist 
assumptions contribute to understanding educational research, its methodologies 
and the design of plural and flexible research methods, even if there are continuing 
philosophical investigations. 
 






This paper has two broad aims. The first aim is to show the limitations of the 
contemporary idea that there are two basic modes of educational research, 
sometimes called quantitative and qualitative research, or also called scientific 
(positivist) and interpretive research. This aim is to challenge those who are learning 
to do educational research and those who are currently practising it to question and 
think through some current dominant conceptions about the nature of this type of 
research. The title refers to avoiding superficiality and scripts in thinking about the 
nature of educational research. Superficiality is about the surface and appearance of 
things, not the important meaning and substance. Scripts, as in the script of a play, 
refer to what is written by someone else for you to read and enact. It is not authored 
by the script-user and does not reflect someone’s own thinking. The second aim of 
this paper is to present a way of thinking about the nature of educational research 
that is informed by contemporary pragmatic and realist philosophical perspectives. 
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This aim is not about presenting a single definitive perspective or stance, but a way 
of thinking about the purposes of research and the designing of flexible research 
methods while still grappling with continuing philosophical questions.    
 
‘Paradigms’ and philosophical assumptions 
Like other abstract words, the term paradigm has a history and assumes many 
meanings to the point where its lack of clarity threatens its usefulness. Talk of 
paradigms in educational research is mostly associated with two competing 
philosophical camps (Pring, 2015), which captures the sense of what some have 
considered to be a ‘paradigm war’ (Gage, 1989).  One camp is the so-called 
positivist paradigm which is represented as assuming a single reality, that the 
knower and the known are independent, that inquiry is value free and that time- and 
context-free generalizations are possible. Methodologies associated with the 
positivist paradigm (often called scientific too) are directed at explaining relationships 
between causes and outcomes in general predictive terms, sometimes referred to as 
nomothetic knowledge. Both correlational and experimental designs of various types 
are used with quantification of variables to enable generalization. (Creswell, 2009). 
The other camp, the so-called constructivist or interpretivist paradigm is said to 
assume multiple perceived realities, the knower and known as inter-dependent, 
inquiry as value based and constructions are local and context based. 
Methodologies associated with interpretivist or constructivist paradigm are directed 
at understanding phenomena from an individual’s perspective, focusing on the 
interaction between individuals taking account of historical and cultural contexts. 
These methodologies represent diverse traditions such as case studies (in-depth 
study of particular in their context) phenomenology (study of direct experience 
without allowing the interference of preconceptions), hermeneutics (deriving hidden 
meaning from language), and ethnography (study of cultural groups over a 
prolonged period) (Creswell, 2009). 
 
Some authors identify more than two paradigms, such as Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
who identified four, positivist, post-positivist, critical and constructivist in 1994 and 
then added a participatory paradigm in Guba and Lincoln (2005). But, on further 
examination these five can be reduced to two key ones, each with one or two 
variations, positivist and post-positivist, on one hand, and constructivist, critical and 
participatory, on the other.  
 
For Guba and Lincoln (1994) a paradigm is defined as: 
‘the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in 
choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental 
ways’ (page 14) 
This conception of a paradigm can be seen as unitary, in the sense that its ties 
together ontology (what is nature of reality?), epistemology (what is knowledge and 
how do we know something?) and methodology (how do we go about finding out?) 
into a package. This unitary sense of paradigm is also foundational as it places 
ontology as the key and starting point in the process of arriving at a research design 
and methods (Crotty, 1998). There are issues with this unitary and foundational 
conception of a paradigm, one of which is its unitary aspect. It tends to treat the 
different levels of the ‘paradigm’ as going together. It is what Biesta (2015) has 
called a ‘container concept’ which means that ‘paradigms’, so defined, have to be 
accepted or rejected as wholes rather than focusing on separate smaller elements, 
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such as methodological or epistemological aspects. This unitary feature of 
paradigms (as defined above) relates to the “incompatibility thesis” (Howe, 1988) 
and the related idea of incommensurability (Kuhn, 1962). Incommensurability means 
that each ‘paradigm’ has its own evaluation criteria, so sealing off criticism of one 
‘paradigm’ by the other and so blocking communication between the ‘paradigms’.   
 
Biesta (2015) argues that this idea of a ‘paradigm’: 
‘becomes an excuse for not having to engage in discussions about the 
assumptions that underpin research’ (page 7). 
‘Paradigm’ talk then becomes a way of closing the argument down by reference to 
philosophical foundations and tends to become a way in which researchers define 
themselves – I am an interpretivist not a positivist researcher’. Others have also 
argued that ‘paradigms’, so defined, are unhelpful. Some suggest using an 
alternative phrase, such as ‘stance’ (Maxwell and Mittapalli, 2010) or ‘cultures of 
knowledge’ (Kagan, 2009). ‘Stance’ is a more neutral term and has little history of 
use about basic world views. ‘Cultures of knowledge’ recognizes the social and 
group nature of knowledge generation as well as implying the idea that being a 
member of a culture can influence researcher identities. Nor does ‘culture of 
knowledge’ have the incommensurability connotation; it is possible to be bi-cultural 
and communicate across cultures.     
 
For Alexander (2006) ‘paradigms’ in educational research reflect epistemological 
differences: knowledge differences with implications for how we know something. He 
calls them epistemological paradigms, aligning them with the duality of positivism 
and constructivism. For Alexander this duality reflects what he calls a metaphysical 
model – a way of considering the nature of reality (what is there and what is it like: 
also called ontological questions). So, Alexander not only recognises the 
epistemological and ontological basis of what has come to be called ‘paradigms’, but 
also suggests that one of the advantages of the two-paradigm model is that it 
legitimises two basic world views and supports a co-existence between them. 
However, he recognizes that this co-existence leads to the problem of self-refuting 
relativism. His argument is that if each ‘paradigm’ has its own assumptions, it is 
unreasonable to criticise one paradigm from the perspective of the other. This is a 
critique of the incommensurability assumption of ‘paradigms’, so defined.  
 
Alexander also questioned the use of the term ‘paradigm’ in educational research, 
given its origins in the work of Kuhn in his famous study on the structure of scientific 
revolutions (Kuhn, 1962). Paradigms for Kuhn were about shared beliefs in a 
community of researchers who share a consensus about what questions are 
meaningful and what procedures are appropriate for answering these questions. 
Kuhn’s analysis focussed on the changes in physics from Newtonian to Einstein’s 
relativity theories, not changes in the broad field of social and psychological 
sciences. So, the term ‘paradigm’ was transferred from its use in science studies 
about groups within a discipline, physics, to basic world views or philosophical issues 
associated with epistemology and ontology. In this respect Alexander also points out 
that Kuhn did not think that the social sciences had a dominant paradigm, proposing 
instead that it was pre-paradigmatic. So, there are problems in using Kuhn’s ideas 
about ‘paradigms’ across the whole social sciences. There were also doubts, 
according to Alexander, about whether the advent of qualitative research 
represented a replacement of quantitative research that could incorporate the 
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previous ‘paradigm’ or put it in a new light. This called into question the use of 
Kuhn’s idea of paradigm change being used in this context. Finally, Alexander also 
pointed out that the duality of positivism and constructivism discourages the mixing 
of quantitative and qualitative research methods which has become more common in 
recent years. Researchers who adopt what has come to be called ‘mixed methods’ 
are eclectic and relate their designs to their research questions, paying less attention 
to ‘paradigm’ purity.   
 
The incommensurability position was also criticized by one of Kuhn’s 
contemporaries, Toulmin (1972), who presented conceptual change as evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary. Toulmin argued that change was not a process of mutually 
exclusive paradigms competing to replace one another. This was an argument, as 
mentioned above, about a relativism that provided no grounds for comparing and 
selecting a ‘paradigm’. Toulmin suggested that Kuhn had ignored the common 
ground shared by all argumentation. It is relevant here to note that Kuhn (1970) in a 
postscript to a subsequent edition of his 1962 book later rejected the idea of 
incommensurability on the grounds that it prevents communication between 
‘paradigms’. Like Toulmin he portrayed persuasion as central to the conflicts about 
‘paradigmatic’ beliefs.  
 
Morgan (2007) in recognising that social researchers meant different things when 
they talk about ‘paradigms’ undertook an analysis of the varied usage of the 
‘paradigm’ term. He identified four conceptions of ‘paradigm’ as: 
i. worldviews (most general concept),  
ii. epistemological stances,  
iii. shared beliefs in a research field, and  
iv. model examples (most specific concept).  
The first ‘world view’ conception refers to a broad perspective on the world that is 
used non-technically and has little relevance to influencing research. The second 
epistemological stance conception, the one discussed above, relates to the 
ontological and epistemological aspects of research. Morgan recognizes this as the 
dominant conception in the social sciences but also notes that though Kuhn 
discussed it, he did not favour it. As for the advantages of this conception Morgan 
sees how it draws on historical elements from philosophy, but its breadth and 
abstractness distances it from direct connections to research methods. Though the 
third concept, shared beliefs in a research field, was the one favoured by Kuhn, its 
use in social research has been rare. Morgan suggests that its impact has been 
minor because it relates to smaller research groups.  The fourth conception, as 
model examples, is the least used sense of ‘paradigm, though Kuhn discussed and 
favoured it too. This is the concept of ‘paradigm’ as specific exemplars of typical 
solutions to problems. In this sense it relates to the illustrations that are evident in 
textbooks about how to combine qualitative and quantitative methods (for instance, 
Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). One of Morgan’s important points is that these four 
conceptions go from the very general (worldviews) to the specific with the specific 
(model examples) nested in the more general. Being embedded in each other, this 
means, for example, that the model examples used by researchers reflect a set of 
shared beliefs about the field. They are not mutually exclusive to each other.   
 
Paradigms as shared beliefs in a research field  
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Having brought out the diverse conceptions of ‘paradigms’ Morgan does not replace 
the term by some other to avoid ambiguity, as some authors have done and as 
discussed above. Instead, he adopts Kuhn’s favoured ‘paradigm’ conception - 
shared beliefs in a research field – in a novel move to examine the changes in social 
science research in recent decades since 1970s. Here he also deploys Kuhn’s 
notion of a ‘paradigm shift’, when researchers no longer agree about which problems 
to pursue (Kuhn’ s ’normal science’) and begin to call these into question and pose 
alternatives (‘scientific revolutions’).  For Kuhn ‘paradigm’ change involved four 
elements: 
i. characterisation of a dominant ‘paradigm (taken as shared beliefs in a 
research field); 
ii. growing problems with existing ‘paradigm’ 
iii. characterisation of an alternative ‘paradigm’ 
iv. agreement that new ‘paradigm’ resolves problems with existing ‘paradigm’. 
 
Morgan’s historical analysis of these changes is that the first shift was from what has 
been called a ‘positivist’ to a ‘metaphysical paradigm’. The ‘positivist’ paradigm was 
taken to represent the dominance of quantitative styles of research methods but also 
about their epistemological assumptions and explanatory purposes. That this 
representation of ‘positivism’ had little to do with the philosophical positivism of the 
day, logical positivism, which was the case, was not the point. What mattered was 
that this was the interpretation given by those who were frustrated with quantitative 
styles of research and were seeking a ‘paradigm’ change. Morgan’s analysis is that 
those seeking change used Kuhn’s idea of a ‘paradigm shift’ explicitly to this end, 
quoting work by Guba, Lincoln, Patton and others in the 1970s who were promoting 
naturalistic and alternative qualitative research approaches. But, where for Kuhn the 
anomalies and problems with the dominant ‘paradigm’ were empirical concerns and 
failed predictions in physics, for the advocates of qualitative research the focus was 
on what qualitative research promised to do that quantitative research could not, on 
one hand, and more abstract concerns about the philosophy of knowledge, on the 
other. The tone of this shift therefore required criticising the dominant ‘paradigm’, so 
leading to the generalised negative connotations associated with ‘positivism’ (Biesta, 
2015), but also to an oppositional framing of quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches.  
 
By adopting Kuhn’s ideas of ‘paradigm shift’, the leading advocates of qualitative 
research moved up to the next level of generality in ‘paradigm’ conceptions, that of 
epistemological stances (see four levels above). So, positivism came to be framed 
as a ‘paradigm’ in this philosophical sense and so was defined in terms of the triad of 
ontology, epistemology and methodology, as realist, objectivist and seeking general 
causal relationships. But, the priority feature of ‘paradigms’ that reflected 
epistemological stances were assumptions about ontological issues. This is why 
Morgan (2007) opted for the term ‘metaphysical paradigm’ to understand how 
alternative approaches, such as constructivism were accommodated at this 
ontological level. In his interpretation the ‘metaphysical paradigm’ conception 
incorporated positivism as one option and made space for the alternative, 
constructivism too.  
 
Problems and changes to the metaphysical paradigm 
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Morgan’s analysis of paradigm changes, within the conception of shared beliefs in a 
research field, assumes that the ‘metaphysical paradigm’ conception has become 
the dominant shared belief within the social sciences. But, as has been discussed 
above, it has over time accumulated some limitations and problems. We find here 
some convergence between Morgan’s analysis of these problems and those 
identified by others, for instance by Alexander (2006) and Biesta (2015), as 
discussed above. These problems are about: i. how ‘paradigm’ boundaries are 
defined, ii. the issue of ‘paradigm’ incommensurability and iii. whether the 
‘metaphysical paradigms’, the dominant conception, affects research design and 
practice.   
 
Morgan’s analysis of the dominant ‘metaphysical paradigm’ conception starts with 
questions about how many paradigms there are, the basic two (positivism and 
constructivism) or more as others have been added (post-positivism, critical theory 
and participatory research). This is about who decides and whether an approach fits 
the requirements of a distinctive mix of the triad of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology to warrant being called a ‘paradigm’. Morgan writes critically about the 
moves to legitimise belief systems as worthy of being a ‘paradigm’. The introduction 
of post-positivism as another ‘paradigm’ followed criticisms about how positivism was 
portrayed in very general negative terms. Labelling post-positivism as a another 
distinct ‘paradigm’ was based only on minor changes to the representation of 
‘positivism’. Its ontology was also represented as ‘critical realist’ (Guba and Lincoln, 
2005), when this had no connection with the tradition of ‘critical realism’ (Bhaskar, 
1986). The lack of reference to the epistemological stance of pragmatism as a 
‘metaphysical paradigm’ is a further indication for Morgan of problems in defining the 
kinds of ‘metaphysical paradigms’. Morgan concludes that what counts as a 
‘paradigm’ is not so much about ontology and epistemology as about ‘ongoing 
struggles between interest groups’ (page 61).  
 
Morgan’s analysis of the issues about incommensurability reflects those discussed 
above, but further highlights the significance of the foundational and unitary nature of 
‘metaphysical paradigms’ for perceptions about incompatibilities and communication 
between ‘paradigms’ at epistemological, methodological and method levels. While 
some researchers support combining qualitative and quantitative methods, but not at 
the ontological level, others deny even method combining. This uncertainty 
contributes to another weakness of the ‘metaphysical paradigms’ approach which is 
whether the philosophical commitments of paradigms have any bearing on the 
design and methods used in research. As discussed above, the moves to combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods calls into question the definition and boundaries 
of the different kinds of ‘metaphysical paradigms’. This is the basis on which Morgan 
continues to use Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigms’, as shared beliefs in a research field, 
to call for an alternative ‘paradigm to the ‘metaphysical paradigms’ given its 
limitations. In this way he uses Kuhn’s idea of a ‘paradigm shift’ against what he calls 
the dominant ‘metaphysical paradigms’ conception. And, in doing so, he admits that 
what he is doing is to create a further ‘paradigm shift’ towards what he calls a 
‘pragmatic approach’.  
 
Pragmatic turn 
To many in educational research the rationale for mixed methods or combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods has been justified as a pragmatic one. This is 
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often framed as not deriving methods from philosophical assumptions but from the 
research questions. This way of framing it detaches the rationale for designing 
research studies from metaphysical considerations, as in the metaphysical paradigm 
perspective, and links the rationale merely to practical methods. There is nothing 
inappropriate about invoking practical considerations in research design, what Biesta 
(2015) called ‘everyday pragmatism’. But, when as some authors have claimed that 
mixed methods research can be justified in terms of philosophical pragmatism, that 
is another matter (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Other authors have suggested that 
an appropriate justification of mixed methods research could be found in classical 
pragmatist philosophy which justifies knowledge in terms of its practical applicability 
rather than its truthfulness or correspondence with an external reality (Burke 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). But, as Morgan (2013) and Biesta (2015), 
amongst others, have pointed out, there is a difference between being pragmatic 
about research methods and pragmatism as an epistemological or philosophical 
stance. 
 
To avoid the caricature of pragmatism as about ‘what works’ it is important to 
understand that pragmatism initially was about clarifying the meaning of terms or 
ideas, following the Peirce’s ‘pragmatics maxim’ that the practical effects of a 
concept is its meaning (Peirce, 1931-58). However, there were divergences between 
Peirce and James, another founding philosopher of pragmatism. For Peirce the  
maxim tied meaning to the experiential consequences of applying the concept, while 
for James the maxim ties meaning to the practical consequences  of belief, possible 
differences of practice (James, 1898). As Haack (2018) notes these early differences 
illustrate continuing differences within pragmatism, with Peirce being towards the 
more realist wing and James the more nominalist wing (denying the existence of 
abstract objects). Nevertheless, within this range of views, pragmatism has been 
seen to reflect the philosophical move away from abstract concerns about what 
exists to an emphasis on human experience and practices. As such, pragmatism is 
not best understood as another philosophical or metaphysical stance like the duality 
discussed above, but as a set of tools to address problems (Biesta, 2015). This 
explains why, as Morgan (2007) has pointed out, the ‘metaphysical paradigms’ did 
not recognise pragmatism as a paradigm. Pragmatism focuses on the interaction of 
action and beliefs in which inquiry is a form of social action rather than an abstract 
philosophical system.  
 
Another way to regard pragmatism is that it aims to naturalise concerns that have 
historically been given a metaphysical perspective. This is exemplified in Dewey’s 
focus on action and inquiry (Dewey, 1915), in which pragmatism can be seen as less 
a theory of knowledge than as a theory of the process and practice of knowing. It 
veers away from metaphysical issues about whether there is an external reality or 
not by focusing on what sense humans make of living. The pragmatic turn as 
exemplified by Dewey’s perspective can be seen as a way of going beyond the 
epistemological tradition that goes back to Descartes which adopted a sceptical 
approach to what is known in the pursuit of certain conclusions and foundations to 
knowledge. Though this Cartesian use of doubt led to certainty about the thinking 
self and mind, it continued to grapple with certainty about a world, both the material 
and social world beyond experience. This mind-world scheme has been associated 
with what Bernstein (2010) has called the ‘Cartesian anxiety”, a longing for certainty 
and unchanging knowledge about the world as a thing separate from humanity. The 
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pragmatist turn therefore opposes simple dichotomies, the inner life versus objective 
reality, but also theory versus practice, a dichotomy which Dewey criticised as the 
basis of his epistemological stance.      
 
In building the case for a pragmatic stance, Alexander (2006) discusses how 
metaphysical perspectives veer between reality (realism) as existing or not (idealism 
/ constructivism), with realism versus constructivism representing the two-paradigm 
model. Alexander summarises the key problem with metaphysical realism as about 
the issues of how knowledge can act as a copy or correspond to reality 
(correspondence or representational views). This arises because humans do not 
have direct access to reality; there is no view from nowhere to check representations 
or knowledge against. The parallel problems of constructivism, according to 
Alexander, are about how personal consciousness can construct a reality, whether 
physical or social. This is the critique that there can be no basis for inter-subjectivity 
that depends only on personal consciousness (Alexander, 2006; Pring, 2015). In this 
context, Schwandt (1997) has pointed out that qualitative researchers, who adopt 
constructivist perspectives, tend to take the existence of things seriously in practice. 
He argues that this contradicts radical constructivist assumptions that deny any 
reality apart from constructions.  
 
Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010) also provide examples of actual research studies that 
adopt constructivist assumptions which presume that constructions are of something 
external. In this context, Searle (1995) developed the distinction between brute facts 
and institutional or social facts in which socially constructed facts involve brute facts; 
for example, schools which are socially constructed involve some brute facts, 
whether they are, for instance, bricks, mortar and/or paper. For Searle, socially 
constructed ‘things’ can be investigated in different ways including objective or mind-
independent ways. These ideas are compatible with Hacking ‘s (1999) analysis of 
social constructionism as about constructions of something. Hacking identifies four 
distinct approaches to the assumptions underlying social constructionist assertions. 
Assuming that X is said to be socially constructed, e.g. a curriculum, learning style, 
intelligence or learning difficulty, then there are different levels of assumptions about 
social construction: 
1. X is taken for granted and appears as inevitable 
2. X is taken for granted and appears as inevitable, need not exist and is not 
inevitable 
3. X is taken for granted and appears as inevitable, need not exist, is not 
inevitable and is bad 
4. X is taken for granted and appears as inevitable, need not exist, is not 
inevitable, bad and is to be done away with or abandoned. 
Each successive assumption includes the previous ones. For example, level 2 
assumptions about ‘intelligence’ could involve that ‘intelligence’ is taken for granted 
and its existence is made to appear inevitable, but its existence is not inevitable. This 
version of social constructionism could be said, according to Hacking, to be 
associated with historical and reformist commitments. But, level 4 assumptions about 
‘intelligence’ would go further and assume that it would be better to abandon 
‘intelligence’ for some other way of framing learning potential. This version of social 
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constructionism would be associated with unmasking and revolutionary 
commitments. Hacking’s perspective illustrates the complexity of social 
constructionist assertions.   
Pragmatism and its limits 
Pragmatism derives its name from the Greek word pragma meaning action with its 
implication that pragmatism focuses on human action in relation to the environment.   
In pragmatism inquiry is about resolving problems that present in experience with 
practice as the driver for inquiry or research, a perspective developed by Dewey 
(1915). For Dewey theory is on a continuum with practice, so the opposition to theory 
– practice dichotomy. Everyday inquiry has links to professional inquiry and 
academic research inquiry. As Alexander (2006) put it, there is nothing as theoretical 
as intelligent practice.  
 
However, there have been criticisms of pragmatism that it results in an unacceptable 
relativism (Pring, 2015). Scott (2007) identifies these issues in terms of Peirce’s 
pragmatic maxim, which Scott takes as implying that truth is understood in terms of 
the practical effects of what is believed, and particularly, how useful it is. 
Two main problems are identified with this perspective: i. if practical or usefulness 
criteria are used to judge research assertions, then current ways of understanding 
the world will take priority over alternative conceptions; and ii. given that there are 
different and conflicting research methodologies in use, there is the question of how 
to judge which is more appropriate given particular social arrangements which in turn 
calls for value judgements. In a similar way Alexander (2006) sees pragmatism as 
succumbing to a self-defeating relativism. For Alexander pragmatism needs to 
assume some conception of what is beyond human action without reverting to a 
metaphysical realism (a view from nowhere); what he calls a ‘transcendental 
pragmatism’.   
 
It is interesting that Bernstein (2010) a contemporary advocate of pragmatism 
recognises this oscillation between those who have a ‘realistic intuition’ and those 
who see any reference to correspondence or representation as a dead-end leading 
to contradictions. However, from a pragmatic perspective this clash can be seen 
more as a matter of human temperament than of metaphysical positioning (James, 
1906). This ‘realist intuition’ was considered by James to reflect a tough-minded 
temperament, that involved going by the facts, being materialistic and sceptical 
amongst other traits. This contrasted with those who were tender-minded, who went 
by principles, were intellectual and idealistic amongst other traits. This 
temperamental way of regarding historical philosophical issues is a further illustration 
of the naturalising of philosophy associated with pragmatism. The tough versus 
tender-minded distinction can be seen as a continuum and people might have a mix 
of these tendencies. So, the tension between those with a ‘realist intuition’ and those 
with an ideas/idealist intuition can be seen as a difference in the emphasis; whether 
to be answerable to the ‘world’ or to our partners in conversation in giving social 
justifications.   
 
These issues with pragmatism have been debated from the early to mid-twentieth 
century, for example between Bertrand Russel and John Dewey. Russell held a 
classical correspondence theory in which truth was about the relation between 
beliefs and an independent reality, to empirical facts. For Dewey (1941) assertions 
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were warranted (assured or justified) if they produce more useful effects, such as 
being more predictive. For Russell (1961) this means that knowledge loses its 
privileged status. One way of putting this key difference in perspective is as follows: 
for Russell whether an assertion is ‘true’ is decided by the causes of an assertion 
(something independent of the assertion), while for Dewey whether an assertion is 
‘true’ depends on the effects of an assertion (its usefulness). But, as Ostbring (2009) 
points out, Dewey denies that assertions are warranted only by their usefulness in 
reaching personally desired results. Dewey is aware of how a superficial perspective 
on pragmatism goes against the deep intuition that whether the usefulness of a belief 
does not make it true.  
 
As Ostbring notes, Russell failed to notice that in Dewey’s perspective an inquiry is 
influenced by a problematic situation which controls the inquiry throughout; it is this 
situation that influences whether an assertion is valid. For Dewey the problematic or 
indeterminate situations are impersonal; they are existential situations in which 
humans, as organisms, find themselves when they interact with their environment. 
Russell’s misunderstanding stems from a failure to understand the pragmatic interest 
is in naturalising epistemology. For Dewey the impersonal or ‘objective’ nature of the 
indeterminate or problematic situation has a biological Darwinian sense with the 
concern with how we cope with the world rather than how the world is. The 
implications from this discussion of the Russell – Dewey debate is that Dewey did 
recognise that the naturalising trend of pragmatist epistemology required some 
impersonal or ‘objective’ condition which drove inquiry. This resembles Alexander’s 
(2006) conclusion that pragmatism required some transcendental element to avoid 
the warranting of assertions only in personal terms.   
 
Pragmatic realism, evolutionary epistemology and critical realism 
This section relates pragmatist ideas to other related philosophical perspectives.  
The term pragmatism / pragmatist can be qualified by another term, in the way 
Alexander chose the term ‘transcendental’, somewhat provocatively to quality his 
pragmatic stance as transcendental pragmatism. By contrast, Putnam (1990), a 
contemporary philosopher with a pragmatist leaning, opted for the phrase pragmatic 
realism, where pragmatic is not qualified but qualifies another term, in this case 
realism. With ‘pragmatic realism’ Putnam attempted to connect a pragmatic 
perspective (the world does not impose a single language on humans; fields of 
knowledge reflect conceptual schemes, human interests and choices) while 
recognising that there are facts of the matter (though these facts are relative to 
conceptual schemes). This pragmatic realism was aiming to avoid both metaphysical 
realism and a strong relativism.  
 
Another perspective with clear links to pragmatist thinking was that of Karl Popper. 
Despite Popper being presented as a post-positivist, in the metaphysical framing of 
paradigms, as discussed above (Guba and Lincoln, 2005), he had very strong 
affinities with pragmatist assumptions. Though Popper has not been identified as a 
pragmatist, he is referenced as recognising Peirce as one of the greatest 
philosophers and quoted as wishing that he had known Peirce’s work earlier in his 
career (Houser and Kloesel, 1992). Bernstein (2010) identifies this link in both 
Peirce’s and Popper’s critiques of Cartesianism; that the search for epistemological 
origins was misconceived. Both tried to switch the focus to the consequences of 
ideas. This relates to one of Popper’s central ideas which was about the falsifiability 
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of knowledge linked to his scheme that knowledge developed through a process of 
conjecture and refutation. His approach was to counter the verificationist approach 
associated with positivist and empiricist philosophers (that statements are 
meaningful only if empirically verifiable or true because of the meanings of their 
terms). Popper favoured a deductive rather than an inductive basis for scientific 
inference (Popper, 1973). For Popper life was about problem solving, in line with 
pragmatist thinking. Knowledge growth was seen to involve a process that started 
with a problem situation that led to a tentative theory. This was then subjected to 
rigorous attempts to falsify empirically. This was about error elimination or what 
Popper called refutation. The theories or ideas that withstood or survived this 
scrutiny were retained. This scheme expressed his evolutionary epistemology, the 
idea that knowledge growth reflected a similar process to biological evolution. 
Theories surviving attempts to falsify or refute them had parallels with genetic 
variation that were retained through natural selection in Darwinian evolution theory. 
The connections between Popper’s conjectures and refutation scheme and Dewey’s 
(1915) action-inquiry epistemology are also clear.   
 
However, Popper’s pragmatist stance like Putnam’s also recognised the 
independent status of knowledge from the knower or subject. Here he recognised 
what he called ‘objective knowledge’; what withstood refutation attempts, rather 
than discussing reality and correspondence ideas associated with metaphysical 
realism. For Popper there were three ‘worlds’: World one was about the physical 
world; World Two was about mental states and ideas and World Three was the body 
of human knowledge expressed in various forms. World three was seen as the 
cumulative product of the second world (mental states and ideas) embodied in the 
materials of the first world (books, papers, artifacts and electronic forms)   
Though Popper was focussed on empirical testing he did not give priority to the 
empirical and believed that theories and ideas direct social research. It is in this 
sense that Popper did not adopt logical positivist ideas with their priority to the 
empirical. Like Searle (1995), as discussed above, Popper saw social objects as 
abstract concepts that were social constructions, but still open to empirical study 
including experimental study (Popper, 1957). However, Popper was careful to avoid 
mistaking trends found in statistical generalisations as general laws that determine 
outcomes. This distinction depends on recognising the context factors that might 
affect similar trends in other samples, places or times. So, though Popper believed in 
the unity of methods across the physical and social sciences, he was clear that 
generalisations needed to be considered as tentative given the contingencies that 
might influence outcomes. In this regard some authors have considered that 
Popper’s stance on causal generalisations as similar to realist ideas about 
generative mechanisms and the contexts that can affect these mechanisms in 
producing outcomes (Bonnell et al., 2018).  
This introduces another contemporary perspective in educational and social 
research, realism or critical realism. Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010) note how some 
versions of pragmatism have been linked to versions of realism, as illustrated by 
Putnam’s pragmatic realism. But, in doing so these authors also highlight how little 
influence realist ideas have had in qualitative research, with some notable 
exceptions, e.g. the realist evaluation of Pawson and Tilley, (1997). Maxwell and 
Mittapalli also suggest that where realist stances differ from other perspectives, such 
as constructivism, is in a commitment to the existence of a real world. What they do 
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not mean by ‘realism’ is that claims, theories or assertions reflect or ‘correspond’ to 
reality (not a metaphysical realism), nor that theories or ideas construct or constitute 
reality (a radical constructivism). Based on Keller’s (1992) idea of theories being 
adequate to work in the world (enabling prediction and action on things and people), 
Maxwell and Mittapalli see theories and concepts as working in relation to reality, in 
the sense of testing assertions and claims against evidence about the nature of a 
phenomenon. The naturalising and pragmatist stance in this account of realism is 
clear. These authors also elaborate on the types of evidence relevant to this testing: 
whether the claim is about beliefs, outcomes or causal relationships. So, claims 
about meaning and perspectives would require different evidence from claims about 
behaviours or the relationships between measured variables. For Maxwell and 
Mittapalli, the idea of testing claims against evidence depending on the kinds of 
claims (whether qualitative and/or quantitative) provides a unifying way for their 
pragmatist inclined version of realism. Their realism offers a productive and even-
handed stance to encompass combined or mixed methods research.   
Scott (2007) proposes a form of critical realism developed by Bhaskar (1986) as 
providing the philosophical means to make sense of decisions about educational 
research methods and strategies at an ontological level. This resembles the use of 
philosophical pragmatism, as discussed above, to inform research design and 
methodologies. Where it differs from pragmatism is in its more explicit ontological 
assumptions about what exists, though without laying claim to absolute knowledge of 
this ontological framework. For Bhaskar, to understand how knowledge and science 
can be constructed one has to ask: what must the world be like for knowledge of the 
world to be possible? (a version of what philosophers call a transcendental 
argument). Critical realism is said to be realist and critical for two reasons. First, 
objects in the world including social objects, exist whether the observer or researcher 
is able to know them or not. Secondly, knowledge is fallible in that the objects of 
knowledge might change and be other than they are taken to be. Here critical 
realism separates out ideas, beliefs and knowledge (epistemology) from things, 
objects and events (ontology) to resist the collapsing of ‘mind-independent’ being 
into our knowledge or experience of being. This collapsing of what exists into what is 
experienced is what critical realists call the epistemic fallacy. The purposes of calling 
this collapsing a fallacy is to oppose the radical constructivist and anti-realist 
assumption that reality arises from the active creation of observers. Here Bhaskar 
distinguishes between: 
1. The real: underlying structures and mechanisms which generate events in the 
 natural and behaviours in the social world 
2. The actual: this is the generated events and behaviours 
3. The empirical: what humans experience of events and behaviours.   
The generative mechanisms at the real level have causal powers that might or might 
not be realised, this depending on contexts that trigger them or not. Bhaskar also 
assumed that the social world is stratified, incorporates mechanisms at different 
levels and elements of these mechanisms cannot be reduced to those at the level 
from which they emerged. In this critical realist scheme, the relation between 
structure and agency is also assumed to operate at the ontological 
level. 
 
Though these three critical realist levels parallel Popper’s three world distinction, the 
realist stance has firmer and more elaborate ontological assumptions about 
causation. In a realist stance, the real mechanisms (or structures) are distinct from 
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the actual pattern of events, requiring experimentation to make sense of their 
operation in controlled or closed environments. This is where critical realism has a 
distinctive model of causation from the Humean one, associated with empiricism and 
positivism, that causation can be inferred from constant conjunction (when one event 
X follows another Y, X is said to cause Y). However, from a critical realist stance, 
causation can be inferred from constant conjunction only in closed systems, where 
conditions are controlled such as a laboratory or a controlled situation. Most of reality 
is assumed not to be closed but an open-system, where Y does not always follow X 
(as a constant conjunction) as other contextual factors might operate. This is the 
basis of the critical realist distinction of mechanisms (the real) from their exercise 
that produces events (the actual) which are apart from our experience (the empirical 
level). These ideas underpin the programme evaluation stance taken by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) who adopt this generative model of causation in understanding how 
social and educational programmes operate. Programmes are understood to 
embody processes in which the context triggers mechanisms to result in outcomes – 
what they call context – mechanism – outcome sequences (CMOs).   
 
From a critical realist perspective structure precedes human agency, as it provides 
the material causes of human action: humans come into a socio-linguistic-epistemic 
context in which they act. But, the structures of society operate through the 
mediation of human agency and social activity (they are not treated as fixed). So, 
society is seen as both a condition for but also reproduced through human agency: 
what Bhaskar called a transformational model of social activity (TMSA) (Bhasker, 
1979). In this model, people do not simply create society, as it pre-exists them and 
society is the necessary condition for their activity. Humans reproduce and transform 
society, as a set of structures, practices, and relationships, without which society 
would not exist. From this Scott (2007) argues that social events and processes 
cannot be reduced to the intentions of agents without reference to structural 
properties. Nor can processes be reduced to structural properties without reference 
to the intentions and beliefs of agents. Methodologically critical realism implies that 
research needs to reflect the close relationship between structure and agency. Scott 
concludes that research strategies and methods need to be chosen to adopt this 
overarching frame. Accounts which focus on either structures or agents cannot 
account totally for social experience. In this view qualitative and quantitative 
research focus on different aspects of social objects, with quantitative data about 
extensional meaning (which refers to some object or person) and with qualitative 
data about intensional meaning (focussed on interpreting meanings). For Scott this 
enables a resolution of the quantitative/qualitative divide, by keeping these modes as 
distinct but enabling the combination of quantitative and qualitative data sets, 
methods and analytical frames; while giving this an account at the ontological level. 
 
It is clear that critical realism takes a form that is distinct from the elements of realism 
associated with Putnam’s pragmatic realism, Maxwell and Mittapalli’s pragmatically 
oriented realism as well as Popper’s World three. Though Bhaskar’s theorizing was 
focused on a kind of naturalism (as opposed to meta-physics), his assumptions 
about the Real give it a central role in understanding the basis of knowledge and 
science. Though he avoided metaphysical realism by using a type of transcendental 
argument (by addressing the question: what must the world be like for knowledge of 
the world to be possible?), his answers distinguish his approach from the above 
forms of realism. His priority to what is assumed to exist, the Real, rather than to 
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human action or practice (as in pragmatism) is made clear in his example about the 
relationships between the solidity of things and human action in relation to them:  
‘it is because sticks and stones are solid that they can be picked up and 
thrown, not because they can be picked up and thrown that they are solid 
(Bhasker, 1979, page 25) 
 
However, Bhaskar recognised that how objects are handled by humans is relevant to 
human knowledge of them, a nod to a pragmatist view of knowledge production. This 
critical realism can also be contrasted with Alexander’s (2006) transcendental 
pragmatism, discussed above. For Alexander, the transcendental is more about the 
place of human purposes and ethics in understanding the basis of social knowledge. 
For Alexander human actions are not only to be explained by statistical regularities 
over which actors have no control, but also in terms of purposes and social norms. 
His argument is that the aims of human enquiry are primarily ethical and political and 
only secondarily epistemological. He moves to this conclusion by assuming that we 
understand behaviour by reference to human purposes. By doing so, this leads to us 
connecting basic human purposes, such as for security and esteem, to higher ideals, 
such as respect and solidarity, what he calls strong values.  
 
However, in basing social and educational research on ethical ideals Alexander 
realises that this basis might be seen to be threatened by disagreements over ethics.  
To this he has two lines of argument. The first is about the nature of ethics that 
informs this transcendental pragmatism. For ideals to be ethical he adopts the 
principle of fallibility; ideals need to be dynamic and not fixed nor dogmatic. This 
implies the possibility that traditions and individuals could be wrong even about basic 
commitments. For Alexander, it is human choice of commitments that implies 
fallibility and for ideals to be ethical also requires fallibility about these ideals.   
His second line of argument is epistemological, in the sense of assuming that 
knowledge is of  
‘an embodied agent constrained by culture, language and tradition, who 
grasps albeit imperfectly the contours of an entity or of an idea that 
transcends – exists independently or outside of – his or her limited 
experience’ (page 214).   
 
This is how Alexander gives priority to meaning and purposes over causal 
explanation in education. Causal links in education depend on meanings and 
purposes within a culture; this is the qualitative basis on which measurement of 
variables is built to make qualities more precise. For Alexander the logic of 
illustration takes precedence over that of generalisation. Human ideals are in this 
view understood first through concrete examples and only secondarily through 
abstract regularities. He illustrates his point with the example of IQ measurement. 
Underlying such measurement, he contends, is a construct of intelligence which 
reflects social and ethical ideals. So, assessing IQ through measurement procedures 
is based on commitments to the kind of society and human flourishing that is valued.  
This is the way in which Alexander presents educational research, as a practice 
grounded in an explicit and well defended view of the good, avoiding dogmatic ideals 
and using qualitative and quantitative research to interpret and develop those 
traditions. The priority he gives to the logic of illustration is itself illustrated by likening 
education research more to a legal analogy than discovering statistical 
generalisations (through randomised controlled trials [RCTs] and other designs). In 
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the legal model warranted evidence about the legal case is presented to those who 
make a judgement. The process involves both evidence and interpretation of the law 
(in the case of educational research, interpretation of educational values). From this 
perspective: 
‘inquiry at its best endows us with insights to better control ourselves not 
generalisations to more efficiently control and dominate others (p 216-7)  
 
An inquiry model as informed by pragmatist ideas 
The final section draws on a version of Dewey’s model of inquiry informed by some 
of Habermas’s (1971/81) early and later ideas about epistemology as the basis for 
thinking about educational research that encompasses different methodological 
approaches. The proposed model draws mainly on Dewey’s ideas, as discussed 
above, and to a lesser extent on Habermas, who has been recognised less as a 
pragmatist philosopher (Bernstein, 2010). Dewey’s (2008) pragmatist stance 
adopted the concept of experience built around two key questions: What are the 
sources of our beliefs? And, what are the meanings of our actions? The answers are 
seen as linked in a cycle, in which the origins of beliefs arise from our prior actions 
and the outcomes of actions are found in beliefs. As Morgan (2014) explains, for 
Dewey experiences bring beliefs and actions into contact in an interpretive process; 
beliefs being interpreted to generate action, and actions interpreted to generate 
beliefs. For Dewey, as discussed above, this inquiry process was relevant across a 
continuum of everyday, professional and academic research inquiry, representing a 
continuum epistemology and underpinning his critique of a theory – practice 
dichotomy.   
 
Morgan (2014) has represented Dewey’s systematic approach to inquiry as having 
five steps: 
1. Recognizing a situation as problematic; 
2. Considering the difference it makes to define the problem one way rather than 
another; 
3. Developing a possible line of action in response to the problem; 
4. Evaluating potential actions in terms of their likely consequences; 
5. Taking actions that are felt to be likely to address the problematic situation. 
 
For the purposes of this account Dewey’s concept of inquiry will be represented as a 
continuous cycle of beliefs that lead to inquiry actions that result in outcomes which 
are the basis for future beliefs:  
  
belief > action > outcome > belief > action > outcome……. 
 
Habermas early ideas about knowledge constituting interests are used to make 
sense of the different ways in which this cycle is approached. His theorising was an 
attempt to develop an inter-disciplinary critical social theory that was distinct from the 
then dominant empiricist-positivist views of science and historicist hermeneutics. 
These knowledge-constitutive interests can be seen as pragmatist and pluralistic:  
pragmatist as it is human interests that constitute knowledge and are pluralistic in 
recognising different forms of inquiry and knowledge. For Habermas there were 
three knowledge-constitutive interests found in human practices that express 
different kinds of inquiry:  
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1. A technical interest: an interest in the prediction and control of the natural 
environment based on empirical-analytic sciences, as in the natural sciences and 
social science that aim at testable general explanations. This interest approaches 
nature and society as objects of possible knowledge linked to systematic surveys 
and controlled experimentation. It treats the objects of study as governed by 
predictable general regularities. 
2. A practical interest: an interest in securing and expanding mutual and self-
understanding in the conduct of life, based on interpretive, or cultural-
hermeneutic sciences. This reflects a kind of enquiry based on and expressing 
action-orientated personal and interpersonal understanding. Society is seen to 
depend on such understanding which involves meaning-making competence. For 
Habermas the hermeneutic sciences bring methodical discipline to everyday 
interactions. 
3. An emancipatory interest: Habermas’s intention in being explicit about technical 
and practical knowledge interests was a form of critical methodological reflection 
to free science of what he called ‘positivist illusions’ and to put the practical 
interest on a par with the technical interest. The emancipatory interest reflects an 
approach to use reason in overcoming dogmatism, compulsion, and domination.  
However, Habermas’s use of Freudian psychology (self-deception) and Marxist 
social theory (socio-political ideology) as expressions of the emancipatory interest 
was problematic. There were issues about psychoanalysis being emancipatory and 
Habermas was focussing on two kinds of critical reflection: of formal approaches to 
knowledge (technical and practical interests) and concrete theories. There were also 
issues about these knowledge interests still assuming a subject-object frame and not 
taking account of the discursive aspect of inquiry. It was later that he revised his 
critical framework to involve a theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1987). In 
this he elaborated two forms of reason – communicative action and strategic or 
technical action, which can be aligned with but go beyond his earlier ideas of the 
practical and technical interest. Given Habermas’s more recent theorising, the 
practical and technical interests will be taken as primary as they concern the content 
of the knowledge interest, while the emancipatory interest reflects a political-ethical 
interest. So, the emancipatory interest will not be a stand-alone knowledge 
constituting interest: it can be combined with either a practical or technical interest.  
In developing this inquiry model based on pragmatist ideas from Dewey and 
Habermas, some recent theorising by Morgan (2007) has also been used. From a 
pragmatist perspective Morgan suggests that research methodologists should give 
equal attention to epistemological and technical (methods) questions. However, 
Morgan presents a framework of the key issues in research methodology which 
contrasts his pragmatist perspective with what he calls a qualitative and a 
quantitative approach. The terms within which he compares these three approaches 
are about: 
1. Connection between theory and data 
2. Relationship to research process 
3. Inference from the data.  
The table below draws on his framework but presents options to the issues framed 
as dimensions. It does not use the language of qualitative and a quantitative 
research, as qual. and quant. refer strictly speaking to types of data and the way 
Morgan uses them, they seem to be proxies for positivist and interpretivist research, 
terms which he aims to avoid. The following framework is informed by pragmatist 
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ideas but does not present a single or definitive pragmatist position. It is a way of 
considering the complexity of epistemological issues in relation to educational 
research methodology. It needs to be read as a developing way of thinking rather 
than a definitive scheme.  
 
In this framework the primary issue is about the knowledge interest that drives the 
inquiry process. This is where Habermas’s three knowledge constituting interests are 
used but not as three alternative knowledge interests. As explained above, the 
technical and practical interests are taken as primary and as alternatives to each 
other. However, they can each be combined with an emancipatory interest or not – 
resulting in four options, as shown in the Table 1 options. These different interests, 
as discussed above, take different knowledge stances which drive the inquiry 
process in particular directions and therefore have some influence on these other 
dimensions but in a loose way. Knowledge production logic involves four 
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approaches. The first is the logic of illustration, based on case studies, as presented 
by Alexander (2006), that aligns with practical interest. But, the practical interest is 
also aligned with an inductive logic in which particular cases become the grounds for 
generalising, not just making illustrative points. By contrast, deductive logic is aligned 
with the technical interest with its focus on testing hypotheses empirically to arrive at 
generalisations. The fourth type of logic, abductive, involves a cycle which goes from 
the particular to the general (inductive) and then tests the general against the 
particular (deductive). This form of logic has been associated with pragmatist and 
critical realist assumptions.   
 
The last two dimensions have clearer alignments with knowledge interests. In the 
dimension of the researcher’s relation to the phenomena, there being two options. 
The first, that involves a connected -inter-subjective relationship, is more aligned with 
practical and emancipatory interests. By contrast, the detached-objective relationship 
is more aligned with the technical interest. There is a similar alignment for the final 
dimension. In the scope of knowledge dimension, the particular and situation general 
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scope of knowledge options align with the practical and emancipatory interests, while 
the general scope aligns with the technical interest.  
 
This framework also makes it possible to illustrate how, i. knowledge interests can be 
single or combined and ii. when combining technical and practical interests designed 
into stages in sequence. These examples are indicative and do not cover all design 
options. 
 
Table 2: Illustrative methodological designs using framework 
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The aim of this paper has been to show the limitations of regarding educational 
research in terms of two ‘paradigms’ which involve incompatible assumptions about 
what exists (ontological assumptions). It has argued that this persistent mode of 
thinking about educational research, associated with wider social research 
assumptions, reflects particular social research interests and has been based on a 
limited understanding of paradigms. The paper has also presented a pragmatist 
philosophical approach to replace the dominant ‘metaphysical paradigm’ conception 
in a way that focuses on inquiry and knowledge production. This places research 
methodology as the central focus with its links to epistemology and methods. This is 
not to discount ontological considerations, as shown in the exploration of the issues 
about whether pragmatist assumptions require some impersonal, transcendent or 
realist assumptions to avoid a strong relativism. As Bernstein (2010) notes, in 
pragmatist circles there is some oscillation between those with ‘realistic intuitions’ 
and those more idealistically inclined. Whether pragmatist thinking requires some 
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form of realism or transcendental element is an important philosophical debate. But, 
it does not bear directly on the contribution of pragmatist assumptions to educational 
research methodologies and the design of plural and flexible research methods.  
 
References: 
Alexander, H.A. (2006) A view from somewhere: explaining the paradigms of 
educational research. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 40 (2) 205-221. 
Bernstein, R., (2010) The Pragmatic Turn. (Cambridge, Polity Press). 
Bhaskar, R. (1986) Scientific realism and human emancipation. (London: Verso). 
 
Bhaskar, R.A. (1979) The possibility of Naturalism. (3rd edition). (London: 
Routledge). 
 
Biesta, G. (2015) Pragmatism and the Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods 
Research SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research, 
page 85-115. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE).  
 
Bonnell, C., Moore, G., Warren, E. & Moore, L. (2018) Are randomised controlled 
trials positivist? Reviewing the social sciences and philosophy literature to asses 
positivist tendencies of trials of social interventions in public health and health 
services.  Trials 19: 238 https://doi.org/10.1186/s13063-018-2589-4 
 
Burke Johnson, R. & Onwuegbuzie, A. (2004) Mixed methods research: a research 
paradigm whose time has come, Educational Researcher, 33(7), 14–26. 
 
Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2007) Designing and conducting mixed 
methods research. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative and mixed methods 
approaches. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). 
 
Crotty, M. (1998) The foundations of social research. (London: Sage) 
 
Dewey, J. (1915) The logic of judgements of practice. In Edited by: J. A.Boydston 
(Ed.), The middle works (1899–1924) (Vol. 8, pp. 14–82). (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press). 
 
Dewey, J. (1998/1941) Propositions, warranted assertability and truth, in The 
Essential Dewey, vol. 2, (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press). 
 
Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and nature. In J. Boydston & S. Hook (Eds.), The later 
works of John Dewey, 1925-1953 (Vol. 1, pp. 1-437). (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press).  
 
Gage, N.L. (1989) The Paradigm Wars and Their Aftermath: A "Historical" Sketch of 
Research on Teaching since 1989. Educational Researcher, Vol. 18, No. 7. 4-10 
 
 20 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In 
N. K. Denzin & Y.  S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research  (pp. 105-
117). (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). 
 
Guba, E.G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and 
emerging confluences. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative 
research (3rd ed., pp. 191-215). (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE). 
 
Haack, S. (2018) Five answers on Pragmatism. Journal of Philosophical 
Investigations, 12, 24, 1-14 
 
Habermas, J. (1971/81) Knowledge and Human Interests. (London: Polity Press). 
 
Habermas, J. (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. (Boston Mass: Beacon 
Press). 
 
Hacking, I. (1999) The social construction of what. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press).  
 
Houser, N. and Kloesel, C. (1992) The essential Peirce: selected philosophical 
writing.  Vol. 11867-1893. (Bloomington, Indianna University Press).  
 
Howe, K. (1988) Against the quantitative-qualitative incompatibility thesis, or, 
Dogmas die hard. Educational Researcher, 17, 10–16. 
James, W. (1898/1977) Philosophical conceptions and practical results, in 
McDermott, J., (ed.), The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, 
(Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press).  
James, W. (1906) Pragmatism; a new name for some old ways of thinking. Available 
online at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5116/5116-h/5116-h.htm#link2H_4_0003 
(accessed 13.3.19) 
 
Kagan, J. (2009) The three cultures: natural science, social sciences and the 
humanities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press). 
 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions. (2nd ed.). (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
 
Keller, E.E. (1992) The secrets of life, secrets of death. Essays in language, gender 
and science. (New York: Routledge).  
 
Maxwell, J. A., & Mittapalli, K. (2010) Realism as a stance for mixed method 
research. in  Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie.C. (eds.), SAGE handbook of mixed methods 
in social & behavioral research (2nd ed.). (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). 
 
 21 
Morgan, D. L. (2007) Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological 
implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research, 1(1), 48–76. 
 
Morgan, D. (2014) Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research. Qualitative 
Inquiry,  20(8) 1045–1053. 
 




Pawson, R. and Tilley, N. (1997) Realist evaluation. (London: Sage). 
 
Peirce, C. S. (1931-58) Collected Papers , (eds). Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, 
and Arthur Burks. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-58). 
 
Popper, K.R. (1957) The Poverty of Historicism. (London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul).  
 
Popper, K. R. (1973) Objective Knowledge: an evolutionary approach. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).. 
 
Pring, R. (2015) Philosophy of educational research (3rd edition). (London:  
Continuum).    
 
Putnam, H. (1990) Realism with a human face. (ed). Conant.J. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press). 
 
Russell, B. (1961) Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. (London: Allen & Unwin). 
 
Schwandt, T.A. (1997) Qualitative inquiry: a dictionary of terms. (Thousand Oaks: 
CA; Sage).  
 
Scott, D. (2007) Resolving the quantitative–qualitative dilemma: a critical realist 
approach. International Journal of Research and Method in Education, 30(1), -17. 
 
Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. (London: Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press). 
 
Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed methodology. Combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. (London: Sage). 
Toulmin, S. (1972) Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of 
Concepts. (Oxford; Oxford University Press).   
 
